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"The Svensson versus McCallum and Nelson Controversy Revisited in the BMW Framework"
Peter Bofinger (a) and Eric Mayer Additionally we highlight the question whether supposedly optimal rules are more likely in fact to be closer to optimal than well -designed simple instrument rules in the face of __________________ # The authors would like to thank Bennett McCallum and Lars Svensson for extremely helpful and valuable comments.
measurement error. As a contribution to literature we supplement the controversy by a forceful graphical analysis. The debate centers on the question by which strategy monetary policy should be implemented. Svensson ((2005) , (2003)) strongly promotes so-called targeting rules. Generally speaking targeting rules can be considered as a policy regime that implements a linear combination of target variables. Often they are consolidated first-order conditions of the central bank's optimization problem. Simple rules can never be as good as optimal monetary policy regimes that use all relevant information. Nevertheless simple rules have the advantage of being robust to model uncertainty as they are not-fine tuned towards a specific model (McCallum (1988) ). Therefore, in the light of uncertainty on the true structure of the economy there is a case for simple rules (Levine , Williams ( 2003) ).
In this note we will compare simple versus targeting rules to clarify the controversy. An important contribution of our note is the explicit comparison of Taylor 
Targeting rules versus Taylor rules in a simple framework
Let us assume that the economy is characterized by the following static version of a New
Keynesian macro model (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2006) , Walsh (2002) ):
(1)
02 dy ππε =++.
Thus the demand side of the economy is governed by an IS-equation (1), where (a) denotes a positive constant and (r) is the real interest rate. The white noise term ε 1 is composed of shocks hitting the demand side (e.g., fiscal spending shocks, preference shocks). The supply side of the economy is given by a New Keynesian Phillips curve, where π 0 denotes the inflation target of the central bank and (y) measures the output gap. The white noise shock ε 2 measures all cost push shocks hitting the economy (e.g., shocks to wages). This reduced-form model is well established in literature and applied in a dynamic version by Svensson (2005) as well as by McCallum and Nelson ((2005), (2003) 
Targeting rules
If monetary policy is conducted according to the notion of a targeting rule as suggested by Svensson (2005) , it will exploit its full knowledge on the transmission structure of the economy. Targeting rules which are directly derived from the central banks objective function are labeled as so called 'strict targeting rules'. Let us assume that monetary policy is guided the following loss function:
Ly ππλ =−+.
Accordingly the central bank aims at stabilizing squared deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target π 0 while equally having a concern for economic activity. If 0 λ > such preferences are defined as a policy of flexible inflation targeting; if 0 λ = we speak of strict inflation targeting or an inflation nutter (Svensson (1999) ). The targeting rule can be derived by solving the following Lagrangian (Bofinger, Mayer, Wollmershäuser (2004) ):
Hydy ππλξππε
where we have used that the IS -equation is a non-binding resource constraint from the pe rspective of the central bank. In other words, the use of the instrument (r) is not associated with any real costs (Walsh (2003), p.524) . Taking the derivative with respect to the output gap (y) and the inflation rate π we arrive at the following two first order conditions:
Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier ξ and solving the resulting expression for the inflation gap (π-π0) retrieves the targeting rule (see Svensson (2005) A micro-founded perception of targeting rules can also be given as follows. In equilibrium it will have to hold that the mar ginal rate of transformation (MRT) between the inflation gap (π-π 0 ) and the output gap (y) has to be equal to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS):
The marginal rate of substitution is determined by the loss function (3) of the central bank, which trades off the goal variables by a factor of λ. Equations (1), (2) and (7) If it is guided by the specific targeting rule, it will opt for point C. By the very definition of a first-order condition this ensures that, for a given value of private sector expectations and thus any location of the Phillips curve, that the loss function (3) is minimized. Graphically, the optimal outcome is thus described by the intersection of the Phillips curve PC 1 with the specific targeting rule of the central bank. In the case of a demand shock we can see from 
McCallum and Nelson's hybrid Taylor rule
As noted, McCallum and Nelson ((2003) , (2005)) have a different perception of the actual conduct of monetary policy. As a reference point they propose the following hybrid rule:
This rule is a hybrid rule as it combines elements of classical Taylor According to this rule the actual real interest rate is defined as the sum of the equilibrium real interest rate (r 0 ) adjusted for the deviation of the inflation rate from the inflation target and the output gap. The relative weight attached to the gaps is determined by the coefficients (e) and (f): (14) ( ) 00 e,f>0 rrefy ππ =+−+ .
If we assume for the sake of exposition that (λ/d) is approximately one and set µ equal to 0.5 the original Taylor rule (14) is just a special case of equation (13), where e=µ and f= µ(λ/d).
Hence if monetary policy sets µ sufficiently low we can evaluate the monetary policy outcomes of rule (13) by analyzing the Taylor rule (14). Under a regime of Taylor rules the economy is described by the equations (1), (2) and (14). Equations (15) and (16) show immediately that a simple rule is suboptimal compared to a targeting rule as demand shocks have an impact on the inflation rate and the output gap.
Graphically the Taylor Within this simple framework we can identify the mechanisms that prevent simple rules from being as good as optimal rules. By comparing the coefficients in the reduced form instrument rules we see for the case of a demand shock that optimal and simple monetary policy rules can only be identical if the reaction coefficient in front of 1 ε in equation (12) and (17) 
McCallum and Nelson's rule as an optimal instrument rule
The hybrid Taylor (1), (2) and (13) give a complete description of the economy. The implied reduced forms are given by: (21), (22) and (23) to (10), (11), and (12) As one can see quite easily for the case of µ approaching infinity, the slope of the aggregate demand function converges towards (λ/d) which is identical to the slope of the targeting rule.
Additionally from equation (13) 
Targeting rules or hybrid Taylor rules? The case of measurement error
In a given New Keynesian model, where the interest rate impacts on inflation and output in the same period the two rules produce identical results in the limit if µ goes to infinity.
Demand shocks do not impose any costs on society, whereas in the case of cost push shocks the central bank chooses its preferred stabilization mix, depending on its preferences λ and the slope of the Phillips curve (d). Thus, the standard model is inappropriate to discriminate between targeting rules and a hybrid Taylor for large values of µ. For small values of µ the question whether to implement simple or optimal policy largely depends on its knowledge of the true structure of the economy. In an uncertain environment it seems reasonable to fall back on simple rules whereas in the case of full knowledge on the transmission structure targeting rules are superior. As a hybrid Taylor 
Measurement error and predetermined private plans
If we modify the timing patterns of the economy, hybrid Taylor rules display central flaws.
Let us assume that the private sector settles its labor and good markets contracts conditioned on the expected real interest rates r Additionally the implementation of hybrid rules for large values of µ contradicts the original idea of simple rules. Simple rules where thought of as a heuristic that equipps policymakers with a robust device to set interest rates reasonably well in an environment when monetary policy is subject to uncertainty concerning the true structure of the economy. Therefore we conclude that McCallum and Nelson's rule becomes completely impracticable in a richer model that incorporates observation and transmission lags. In such a context the implied real interest rate volatility might be detrimental for any kind of financial intermediation.
